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SPAIN: CIVIL WAR

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Spain: Civil War

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IN midsummer of 1936 the long series of political killings by Fascists on the one hand and Socialists, Communists and Anarcho-Syndicalists on the other came to a climax. At ten o'clock on Sunday evening July 12 José del Castillo, lieutenant in the shock police, was shot down in front of his Madrid home, supposedly by Fascists. At three o'clock the following morning members of the shock police appeared at the home of José Calvo Sotelo, Monarchist leader and Finance Minister under the former Primo de Rivera dictatorship.¹ He was taken away in a police van, and an hour later his dead body was left with the porter of a Madrid cemetery. The killing of this brilliant orator and politician provoked violent protests from the Monarchists, Fascists and allied groups.

Four days later, on July 17, the civil war began with the rise of a number of regiments in Spanish Morocco against the government. The leader of the movement, General Francisco Franco, flew to Morocco from the Canary Islands where he had been stationed as Governor. With the backing of the Foreign Legion, Moorish contingents and regular army troops, the insurgents made themselves masters of Spanish Morocco, encountering little resistance. The following day the rebellion spread to Spain itself. By July 19 garrisons under the leadership of prominent generals had mutinied in all parts of the country. On July 20, however, General José Sanjurjo, friend of former King Alfonso and leader of the unsuccessful Monarchist coup in 1932, was killed when the airplane which was carrying him to Spain crashed near Lisbon. He was report-

1. In December 1934 Calvo Sotelo had been reported as attempting to initiate a movement for the simultaneous restoration of the Monarchy and the establishment of a Fascist corporative state on Italian lines. Cf. *New York Times*, December 6, 9 and 23, 1934. The shock police or Assault Guards were organized under the republic, and their ranks included many Left-wing adherents.

ed to have been the choice of revolutionary leaders for supreme chief of the new movement.²

The Rebel generals were supported, it was estimated, by 90 per cent of the officers and perhaps two-thirds of the army rank and file. The forces of the regular army stationed in Spain numbered approximately 100,000; those in Africa, 35,000, of whom almost 9,000 were Moors and 13,000 members of the Foreign Legion.³ In addition, a good part of the Civil Guard or constabulary, whose total strength was 32,000, went over to the Insurgents. The government was thus left with a small remnant of the army, a portion of the Civil Guard—whose loyalty was none too certain—and of the shock police or Assault Guards, numbering 17,000. The army air force and the navy, in part, also remained loyal. In the navy the officers' plan to turn the vessels over to the Rebels was balked by the determined opposition of the crews.⁴

At best, however, these forces were utterly inadequate to stem the tide of revolt. The only alternative to immediate capitulation was mobilization of the masses in the Left-wing labor groups. With the help of these organizations, Socialist and

2. Before the revolt General Sanjurjo as well as the Fascist leader, Primo de Rivera, had passed several weeks in Berlin, in touch with Nazi officials. (*Manchester Guardian*, August 5, 1936.) The Ibero-American Institute at Berlin, designed to develop cooperation between the German and Spanish military, served as the intermediary through which Spanish officers established contact with the Hitler government. The president of the Institute was General Faupel, who organized the supply of war materials in Germany for the Rebel generals and later was named German chargé at Burgos following Nazi recognition of Franco. (*Journal des Nations*, Geneva, November 25, 1936.)

3. Cf. *Anuario Militar Español*, 1935 (Madrid), pp. 130-33. For a description of the rôle played by the Moors in the civil war, cf. Frank L. Kluckhohn, "With the Moors on the March in Spain," *New York Times Magazine*, November 22, 1936.

4. The rôle of the navy in the civil war is briefly reviewed by Hanson W. Baldwin in the *New York Times*, November 22, 1936, p. 38.

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Communist workers and later Anarcho-Syndicalists were given arms. A Popular Militia—approximately 50,000 strong and including women as well as men, undisciplined and hastily organized but with the enthusiastic strength of a mass movement—now stood behind the government.⁵


This development led to a cabinet crisis; in fact Madrid had three Premiers within the span of twenty-four hours. Early on July 19 Cesares Quiroga resigned. He was succeeded—but only for a few hours—by Martínez Barrio, who then gave way to José Giral, an obscure politician and a friend of Azaña. The new Prime Minister was manifestly only a figure-head through whom the President would actually govern. The Giral Cabinet was limited to Left-Republicans and included no Socialists or other labor representatives.

Following seizure of Spanish Morocco—where Spain's best-trained troops were concentrated—and victory in the provincial capitals, the Rebel generals had apparently planned that in the third stage of the revolt the troops at Madrid would rise and overturn the republican régime. But the arming of the masses upset their calculations. On July 19, when sporadic fighting began in the capital, the armed workers were on the streets in force. They met the attacks of Fascist desperadoes who fired from automobiles at the police and militia. On the following day the troops in Montaña and Carabanchel garrisons mutinied, but after a few hours' struggle the barracks were captured by the workers' militia, Civil Guards and police. Madrid had been saved for the government.⁶ The strife led to the burning of churches and convents. In Barcelona, also, armed workers crushed the rebellion in a three-day conflict.

The revolt at its inception appeared purely a

5. Before the revolt, many labor groups had already created an armed militia. Cf. Edward Conze, *Spain Today* (New York, Greenberg, 1936), p. 125.

6. A vivid and detailed account of events in the capital during the first days of the revolt is given in the *New York Times*, August 5, 1936. For a picture of Barcelona in the same period, cf. Megan Laird, "Diary of Revolution," *Atlantic Monthly*, November 1936 and also *International Press Correspondence* (London), August 15, 1936. Robert Neville reports life in Granada from July 18 to August 14 in the *New York Herald Tribune*, August 30, 1936 and the *New Republic*, September 16, 1936.



military movement. Whatever other elements were involved in the conspiracy,⁷ the initiative for the rebellion clearly lay with the generals. Insurgent supporters declare that Franco's revolt was originally planned to forestall a Socialist-Communist coup, which Largo Caballero had scheduled for September.

The Moors, Foreign Legion, regular army troops and Civil Guards under the control of the Rebels were augmented by civilian volunteers—Fascist followers of Primo de Rivera and Carlists, especially in the north. Churchmen and large landowners gave sympathy and active support, and many Right politicians backed the movement. On its outbreak Gil Robles fled to France, but soon went on to Portugal, where he was reported serving as purchasing agent for the generals. On August 29 he appeared at Rebel headquarters in Burgos to declare: "I am with Spain and Spain is here."⁸

The movement began without a program. In a

7. Reports that a military-Fascist revolt was under preparation had been current for some time. Calvo Sotelo was declared to be the civil politician most closely in touch with the army officers. It is also charged that Gil Robles, when Minister of War in 1935, had entered into close relations with army leaders, and had ordered manoeuvres in the Guadarrama mountains to facilitate construction of fortifications which were later used by the Rebel forces moving on Madrid. Cf. Harry Ganns and Theodore Repard, *Spain in Revolt* (New York, Knopf, 1936), p. 74.

8. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 30, 1936. For a collection of the daily communiqués issued by government and Rebels, cf. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (Paris), *Bulletin Périodique de la Presse Espagnole*, October 3 and November 18, 1936.

manifesto issued at the outbreak of the revolt, General Franco attempted to justify his cause by proclaiming that anarchy was rife, emphasized the prevalence of strikes, assassinations and disorder, and declared that "the forces of public order remain held to their garrisons by authorities who intend to dishonor them."⁹

But beyond announcing a crusade against foreign "isms" and a general campaign in favor of "fraternity, liberty and equality," the generals did not seem ready to proclaim their goals. Although supported by the Monarchists, the Insurgent leaders early declared their loyalty to republican principles.¹⁰

Two months later, General Franco declared at Burgos: "This is not only a civil war, where Spanish destinies are at stake, but a war in defense of Christian civilization . . . We are defenders of faith and spirituality against Red materialism. Those who are under the inspiration of Moscow try to sap the foundations of our country, our family life, and our traditions. Now we promise the Spanish people that no home shall lack a hearth and fire; no worker shall lack bread; everybody will work. . . Our hand shall be hard and relentless to establish social justice." Franco was opposed to universal suffrage and instead favored expression of political activity through "technical organizations and corporations" and through a "hierarchical régime"—the Fascist conception.¹¹

In the field the Rebel armies at first made slow progress and their plan of campaign for convergent action on Madrid suffered a serious breakdown. Government control of the navy hampered Franco's transport of troops from Morocco, forcing him to adopt the slow procedure of shuttling them across in airplanes, with the help of occasional transports which succeeded in evading loyal vessels.

INSURGENTS ADVANCE TOWARD MADRID

By the first of August the Insurgents were reported to be receiving effective aid from Italy and Germany, in the form of bombing planes, artillery and other supplies.¹² On the 8th General Franco ar-

9. *New York American*, July 22, 1936.

10. Cf. statements of General Miguel Cabanellas, head of the Burgos Junta (*New York Herald Tribune*, July 26, 1936), and General Emilio Mola (*New York Times*, August 5, 1936). The latter refused to permit the enlistment of Prince Juan in his forces, and was reported to have ordered the arrest of any member of the royal family who appeared in his jurisdiction.

11. *The Observer* (London), October 4, 1936.

12. Cf. Vera Micheles Dean, "European Diplomacy in the Spanish Crisis," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 1, 1936. This report discusses the international aspects of the Spanish struggle.

rived at Seville to direct a Rebel drive northward. His troops met with peasant sniping from the hills and determined resistance from workers' militia in the towns and villages. But on August 14 the city of Badajoz fell to the advancing Moors and Legionnaires. This opened an important gateway to Portugal and cleared the way for General Franco's forces to establish contact with the northern army of General Mola. The latter, who had meanwhile been stopped by the Loyalists in the Guadarrama mountains, had diverted some troops for a campaign against Irún and San Sebastián. Irún, almost reduced to ashes, fell on September 4 after a bitter struggle. A week later San Sebastián was captured by the Rebels. The fall of these centers relieved pressure on the rear of Mola's forces, and—more important—closed for the government not only its main gateway to France but its principal line of communication through friendly country between the northern front and Catalonia.

On the day marked by the fall of Irún, the "grave situation of the civil war" led to a cabinet change at Madrid. The Giral ministry was replaced by a much stronger and more representative government under Francisco Largo Caballero, dynamic Left-wing Socialist. His was the first cabinet since the Popular Front victory to include labor representatives and was made up of six Socialists—including the more moderate Indalecio Prieto—two Communists, three left-Republicans, and one Minister each from the Catalan *Esquerra* and the Basque Nationalists, a conservative and Catholic group.

From Badajoz, Franco's troops advanced steadily northward to Cáceres and thence northwestward up the Tagus valley toward Madrid. At Maqueda, forty miles from the capital, the Rebel general diverted part of his force southward for the relief of the beleaguered Alcazar in historic Toledo. On September 27 the Moors entered the city from which their ancestors had been expelled many centuries before. The 70-day siege of the Alcazar was lifted. Since July 20, 1,100 men—cadets, officers and troops—and some 400 women and children had held out in this ancient fortress.¹³ During the siege 139 were killed, 430 were seriously wounded and 150 slightly hurt. Less than 300 of the Rebels passed through the ordeal unscathed.

RISE OF THE POPULAR MILITIA

The Popular Militia, despite individual courage and heroism, proved unable to stop the advance of General Franco's disciplined Moors, Foreign

13. The Rebels held a number of Loyalists captive throughout the siege, including some women.

Legionnaires and regulars. These Loyalist troops, who made up the bulk of the government forces, had been hastily formed at the outbreak of the revolt. The proletarian masses—Socialists, Communists, Anarcho-Syndicalists and peasants—rose to oppose the Rebels, and fought with bare hands, paving stones, kitchen knives, and with the rifles and revolvers secured from government barracks and arsenals.¹⁴ Each of the labor parties organized its own body of militia. Authority was divided between the military commanders and political committees. The latter controlled organization and training, and directed supply and transport. Troops were often moved by the political committees, irrespective of the central command. From the first the militia chose its own officers, but only after considerable delay were these new leaders given any technical military instruction. Machine guns and mortars were scarce.¹⁵

On the accession of the Largo Caballero Cabinet at Madrid, the authorities attempted to unify the military command and transform the Popular Militia into a regular republican army. On October 10 the government issued a decree which sought to impose military discipline on Loyalist volunteers and place all columns under one direction. Later an "Anti-Fascist Military Academy" was established to give officers a short training course.¹⁶

The Rebels, on their side, were handicapped by small numbers. General Franco was reported to have no more than 15,000 effective troops, and General Mola in the north only about 10,000. But these forces were superior to those of the government in organization and discipline, as well as in tactics and unity of command. The Rebels also had the advantage in aircraft, tanks, artillery, modern machine guns and war machinery of all sorts. At the start of the revolt, they were credited with 20 to 30 planes, but by October they had been strengthened by 100 Italian and German aircraft, and 40 Italian tanks. Foreign correspondents with the "Nationalist" army reported that its backbone was now composed of Italian, German and Moorish troops. Italian officers in national uniforms were to be seen at many

14. For vivid descriptions of the fighting in Barcelona, cf. Jean-Richard Bloch, *Espagne, Espagne!* (Paris, Editions Sociales Internationales, 1936), pp. 32 ff.; and Ralph Bates, "Compañero Sagasta Burns a Church," *New Republic*, October 14, 1936.

15. For a description of the militia in the field around Saragossa, cf. articles by Walter Duranty in *New York Times*, August 28 and September 1, 2, 1936.

16. *International Press Correspondence*, October 24 and December 19, 1936.

points along the Insurgent lines.¹⁷ By the end of October, however, it became evident that the government had obtained—presumably from the Soviet Union—substantial supplies, particularly planes and tanks.¹⁸

REBELS ORGANIZE BURGOS JUNTA

General Francisco Franco's *de facto* leadership of the Insurgent cause was formalized by the Rebel Junta on September 30, when at Burgos he was made practical dictator, being named "Chief of the Government of the Spanish State," and "Generalissimo of the national forces of land, sea and air."¹⁹ The Junta called up the reservists of the 1933, 1934 and 1935 classes (estimated at 50,000 men), requisitioned the properties of various companies whose directors were considered opposed to the "noble ends" sought by the Junta, outlawed all political organizations which had formed part of the Popular Front since the call for the February elections, prohibited for the time being all political activities, particularly on the part of workers' or employers' organizations, replaced the republican flag by Spain's traditional red and yellow emblem, and declared that public schools being no longer secular, religious instruction would be compulsory.²⁰ Agrarian reform was suspended, and all properties on which the program of distribution had not been carried through the final legal stages—especially those which had been subdivided or occupied after the victory of the Popular Front—were to be returned to their former owners.²¹

Despite the military successes of the Insurgents, two factors cast doubt on the political strength of their movement. First, serious differences on policy existed between three principal groups—the military, the Monarchists and the Fascists. Franco and some of his fellow officers inclined toward establishment of a corporative state, based on the army. The Rebel leader apparently favored breaking up the great estates and curbing the church's

17. *New York Times*, October 23 and 30, 1936. The Spanish Embassy in Paris asserted that Italian forces dominated the Balearic Islands. *The Times* (London), October 28, 1936.

18. *Le Temps* (Paris), October 31, 1936.

19. *Boletín Oficial de la Junta de Defensa Nacional de España* (Burgos), September 30, 1936, Decree 138. The Rebel officers had organized their government at Burgos on July 24, under the title of the National Defense Junta of Spain. General Miguel Cabanellas served as president. *Ibid.*, July 25, 1936. The title of this publication was changed on October 2 to *Boletín Oficial del Estado*. It is hereafter cited as *Boletín*.

20. *Ibid.*, August 11, 17, 25, 29, 30, September 4, 16, 24, 28, 1936. In the school curriculum, sports were to include "pre-military instruction." The study of Portuguese, Italian and German was to be expanded. *Ibid.*, September 28, 1936, Order 207.

21. *Ibid.*, August 30, Decree 74; September 26, Decree 128; September 28, Decree 133.

influence in politics.²² But the Monarchists and their allies, the large landholders, desired to balk reform of the land system and restore the Spanish throne. With the general aims of the Spanish Fascists or Phalanxists who made up an important part of the Rebel militia, Franco apparently sympathized. But he regarded them as extremists and potential rivals of the military for dominance of political life. In September the Fascists published a program calling for repudiation of the capitalist system, nationalization of banks and public utilities, division of the large holdings and state regimentation of agriculture, and government domination of the church. They also declared against "permitting the military to dictate Spanish politics."²³

The second political weakness affecting the Rebel movement was its lack of popular support outside of certain provinces in the north. Despite the fact that much of the territory around Mérida and Cáceres had been in Insurgent hands for seven weeks, one correspondent reported at the end of October:

"So violent has been the sniping and guerrilla warfare back of General Franco's lines that in the past ten days he has opened a reign of terror along the whole Rebel line from Maqueda, near Madrid, through Talavera de la Reina to Badajoz . . . An impartial observer is forced to the conclusion that General Franco's movement is extremely unpopular with the bulk of the people, who regard it as an attempt of the privileged class to turn the clock back."²⁴

TERROR AND ATROCITIES

By this time "terror" and atrocities had become almost a commonplace in the Spanish struggle. Its ruthless and fanatical cruelty rivaled that of a religious war. The medieval practice of holding hostages was revived. Although present-day charges will doubtless prove in time to have been greatly exaggerated, there seems little doubt that both Rebels and Loyalists have been guilty of large-scale executions. Loyalists and labor supporters massacred thousands of Fascists, landowners, clericals and church adherents, and members of Right-wing parties. On October 3 a Vatican City dispatch alleged that approximately 400 priests or male church officials and about 100 nuns had been killed; some 500 were missing; about 1000 others had fled the country.²⁵ In Madrid, Barcelona and

22. Cf. Frank L. Kluckhohn, "Franco Wages War with a Light Heart," *New York Times Magazine*, November 8, 1936.

23. *New York Times*, September 7, 1936.

24. *Ibid.*, October 30, 1936. For Miguel de Unamuno's statement, "the sight of Germans in Spain kills me," cf. *New York Times*, January 3, 1937.

other cities members of the upper classes were taken from their homes by armed workers and never seen alive again. Anarchists in Valencia admitted to one correspondent that there had been 1500 clandestine executions of alleged Fascists. Another reported that up to December 25,000 had been killed in Madrid.²⁶

The government authorities frequently voiced disapproval of popular violence, but in many cases proved unable to curb it effectively. The Rebels, on their side, advancing into territory where Rightist supporters had often been slain in large numbers, apparently made wholesale execution of opponents a definite policy. As early as July 30 Colonel José Palacios, Rebel commander with the army of the north, declared: "I take no prisoners. Anybody other than uniformed soldiers of the Spanish Army caught by me carrying arms finds the death he deserves."²⁷ General Franco, holding that all those voting for the Popular Front were *ipso facto* Communists, has carried out in the territories conquered by his troops a policy of so-called "necessary elimination." It is thus described by an American correspondent:

"Insurgent troops kill the ringleaders of the Left forces as soon as they capture any town. Then they leave the place in peace for about a week, during which agents investigate. Finally they start rounding up those who supported the Loyalist cause or who are suspected of having done so. These persons are led to cemeteries, where they are shot in groups of about twenty throughout several days and nights."²⁸

A particularly large-scale massacre took place when Badajoz fell to the Insurgents on August 14. As fast as Loyalists were captured they were sent to the bull-ring to be shot down by machine guns. Men were stopped in the street and their shirts

25. *Ibid.*, October 4, 1936. Cf. also Michael Williams, "How Many Slain?" *Current History*, December 1936.

26. Lawrence A. Farnsworth, *New York Times*, November 8, 1936, and William P. Carney, *ibid.*, December 7, 1936. Cf. also *A Preliminary Official Report on the Atrocities, committed in southern Spain in July and August, 1936*. . . . The Committee of Investigation appointed by the National Government at Burgos (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1936). However, a check of reported executions in Barcelona found them exaggerated five or ten fold. Cf. John Langdon-Davies, *Behind the Spanish Barricades* (New York, McBride, 1936), pp. 130, 131. For an illuminating account by an English resident of conditions in Málaga, cf. *ibid.*, pp. 82-85.

27. *New York Herald Tribune*, July 31, 1936.

28. Frank L. Kluckhohn, *New York Times*, October 11, 1936. Robert Neville reports a similar policy was carried out in Granada. The executions took place in the cemetery, and the caretaker finally went mad. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 30, 1936. The Governing Board of the Madrid Bar Association accused the Insurgents of killing 9000 workers and peasants in Seville and shooting 2000 in Saragossa. Many Leftist deputies were executed (*La Libertad*, Madrid, September 30, 1936).

ripped back; if their right shoulders showed rifle bruises, they were hurried off to the firing squad. Two militiamen discovered among the crowd in the cathedral were reported shot on the steps of the altar. Estimates placed the number killed at 1200 to 4000.²⁹

BATTLE FOR MADRID

By November 7 the Insurgents' advance had carried them to the limits of Madrid, and the battle for the capital began. The city was expected to fall with little delay. The Loyalist cause seemed lost. But suddenly, in what may prove to have been the turning-point of the war, the morale of the defenders stiffened. The government militia was re-enforced by the International Volunteers, a column of anti-Fascist Germans and Italians, Russians, Poles and French Leftists, commanded by Colonel Emil Kleber. A contingent of 5000 Catalan militia reached the capital. The arrival of airplanes and tanks was announced. The attackers were stopped on the western side of the city along the line of the Manzanares river. The downtown section of the capital was shelled by artillery and repeatedly bombed from the air. At the end of the month the Mayor of Madrid announced that between November 8 and 28 the toll from Insurgent planes had been 365 killed and 1936 injured.³⁰

The Rebel threat to Madrid had led on November 4 to reorganization of the cabinet. Since early September the government had been dominated by the Socialists, whose strength among labor groups had long centered in the capital. But the Anarcho-Syndicalists were demanding a voice in public affairs commensurate with their strength. Recognizing apparently that the fall of Madrid would menace next their strongholds in Catalonia, the Anarcho-Syndicalists finally waived their anti-political scruples and named three representatives in the government, among them the outstanding leader, Juan Oliver. Three days later the Loyalist government transferred its seat to Valencia.³¹ The

29. Jay Allen gives a graphic account of these events in the *Chicago Tribune*, August 30, 1936. Cf. also *The Times*, August 17, 1936. For the testimony of other American correspondents on Rebel massacres, cf. *Journal des Nations*, November 25, 1936, which reports an address by Edmond L. Taylor, president of the Anglo-American Press Association in Paris, and also correspondent in that city of the *Chicago Tribune*, which is strongly anti-Communist. After a visit to Spain, Mr. Taylor described Franco's troops as acting like "mad dogs" and "ferocious beasts."

30. *New York Times*, December 1, 1936.

31. On October 19 President Azaña had arrived in Barcelona for an indefinite stay. Azaña has subsequently remained in Catalonia, taking little part in political activity.

capital was left in charge of General José Miaja and a Council of Defense, representing the various labor and Left-Republican groups in the Popular Front. This move brought the central authorities into closer geographical relations with Barcelona, where their authority had become a mere shadow in the course of the civil war, and emphasized anew the importance of Catalonia to the Loyalist cause.³²

In Catalonia the struggle for power among rival proletarian groups had been more intense, but a degree of working unity had been achieved earlier than at Madrid. Three principal groups sought the support of the masses. The Anarcho-Syndicalists had traditionally predominated in the region. But their position of leadership was threatened by the Socialists, who had made important gains since the outbreak of the July rebellion. The United Socialist Party of Catalonia (PSUC) held the same close relation to the Catalan General Workers' Union (UGT) as the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) to the National Confederation of Labor (CNT). In addition there was the semi-Trotzkyite Workers' Party of Marxist Unification (POUM).³³ This party, which claimed to have increased its supporters to 45,000, criticized the willingness of the Socialists to cooperate with bourgeois organizations toward a moderate "democratic" revolution, and demanded unity among proletarian groups to carry through an immediate and radical social revolution. The Socialists, however, asserted that in the crisis of civil war the fundamental problem was to forge common action toward victory. Working unity was essential not alone in political and military activities, but even more so in the every-day problems of factory adjustment for development of a war industry. The situation required, it was alleged, subordination of doctrinal differences to practical cooperation, between both Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists, and also with the lower middle-class. Given the prevalence of small factories in Catalonia, collaboration of the technicians and directive personnel in this group was indispensable. Hence the civil war, ran the argument, represented a struggle between democracy and fascism, rather than one phase of the

32. Catalonia had established practical independence of activity in at least five important departments of government: military defense, public order, finance, economy and education. It had also created a Secretary of Exterior Relations. In conversations at Valencia in January 1937 the Barcelona delegates reasserted their doctrine of "a Catalan state within a federal republic." Previously Premier Tarradellas had declared that Catalonians "aspire to fuller liberty" than that conceded in the Statute of Autonomy. *New York Times*, January 4, 1937.

33. For a brief discussion of these groups, cf. Charles A. Thomson, "Spain: Issues Behind the Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, January 1, 1937, pp. 249, 250.

world-wide conflict between socialism and fascism, as the POUM asserted. Among the share-croppers and tenant farmers, the Union of Rabassaires and Workers constituted a fourth party estimated to have 35,000 members.³⁴

LABOR TAKES POWER IN CATALONIA

From the beginning of the civil war the proletarian bodies attained considerable political as well as economic influence in Catalonia. Every city and town had its Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias. In the Central Committee, formed at Barcelona on July 22, the labor organizations named ten representatives, the middle-class Republicans four, and the peasants one.³⁵ This agency exercised more real authority than the regional government, or Generalidad, which was largely reduced to the function of a political rubber stamp.

But the committee represented a unity of action more apparent than real. Each party jealously retained exclusive control of its own militiamen and of the factories and other agencies which its members had occupied.³⁶ Bickering and recrimination were rife. The rivalry brought several shifts in the cabinet of the Generalidad. On July 31 Juan Casanovas formed a government, dominated by the *Esquerra* but containing 3 Socialists. This régime sought to assume control of the various militia groups and provoked the opposition, particularly, of the Anarcho-Syndicalists. The Socialists then withdrew from the ministry; and a cabinet reconstituted by Casanovas, almost entirely from the *Esquerra*, held office until September 26.

On this date the proletarian organizations gained control of the Generalidad government, with a majority of the seats in a new cabinet headed by José Tarradellas of the *Esquerra*. The Anarcho-Syndicalists consented to enter the ministry with three representatives, thus anticipating a similar step taken in November at Madrid. The new régime issued a proclamation pledging coordination of all forces for victory, and establishment of

34. Other agrarian organizations were the Peasants' Union, affiliated with the CNT and composed solely of agricultural laborers, and the Federation of Land Workers, affiliated with the UGT. This agency possessed a reported membership of 500,000 farm workers in all Spain, but was of small importance in Catalonia. For a review of the agrarian question in the region, cf. *The Spanish Revolution* (Barcelona), October 21, 28 and November 4, 1936. This publication, issued in English, is the weekly organ of the POUM.

35. The proletarian delegates were divided as follows: 3 of the CNT; 2 of the FAI; 3 of the UGT; 1 of the PSUC; 1 of the POUM. Of the four middle-class delegates, three represented the *Esquerra* and one the more conservative Catalan Action.

36. On this period, cf. M. E. Ravage, "Hopeful Catalonia," *The New Republic*, December 9, 1936. The CNT, for example, was accused of running the street cars, buses and taxicabs as "its own property."

obligatory service and discipline in the militia. Following organization of this cabinet, the Central Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias at Barcelona declared itself dissolved and turned over its powers to the civil régime.³⁷

Although proletarian influence in the Generalidad was thus augmented, the dissolution of the Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias was criticized as signifying abandonment of the purpose to create a new Red Army. The armed forces were left in the hands of many officers who, it was argued, in the event of a Loyalist victory, would be more closely linked to bourgeois Republicans than to the working class.

On October 22 the Anarcho-Syndicalists and Socialists took an important step toward even closer collaboration. Leaders of the Iberian Anarchist Federation and the CNT pooled their differences with those of the United Socialist party and the UGT, and issued jointly a 15-point pact which covered most of the popular grounds of dispute and outlined the general structure of a future society.³⁸ Pledging support to the Generalidad, this declaration announced: "We are in favor of collectivization of production, i.e., expropriation without indemnification of the capitalists, and transfer of such property to the community. We are in favor of collectivization of all that is necessary for the war." But socialization of small industries was opposed "except in case they belong to Fascists or answer urgent needs of the war." In the case of foreign enterprises, compensation was advocated to the amount of capital invested. Land, according to the statement, "belongs to the local governments, and we assure individual cultivation to those who are not disposed to do so collectively. The sale, exchange and purchase of products will be carried out through the Agricultural Unions." Dwellings, except small urban properties, were to become the property of the local governments. Nationalization of banks was favored. Domestic production and foreign commerce were to be subject to state regulation. A single military headquarters "coordinating the action of all the fighting forces" was favored to win the war. Catalonia's practical independence from control by the central government was evidenced by a clause declaring: "We are in favor of establishing a basis of political, eco-

37. For the full list of the cabinet and its announced program of government, cf. *La Vanguardia* (Barcelona), September 27, 1936. The stress of military necessity was apparently responsible for the end thus put to the period of "dual power," during which—according to Marxist theory—the nascent proletarian régime, while not openly attacking bourgeois government, should gradually absorb its powers.

38. For text, cf. *El Noticario Universal* (Barcelona), October 23, 1936.

nomic and military collaboration with the Spanish government if and when all the organizations represented by us participate in it." Good feeling between the two rival labor federations—CNT and UGT—was to be safeguarded by a pledge of "freedom of labor organization and joint action to suppress all kinds of compulsion."

Despite these steps, friction continued among the governing groups, particularly between the United Socialist party (PSUC) and the POUM. The conflict came to a head in mid-December, and on the 17th a new ministry was formed under Tarradellas. In this the proletarian masses were represented, not by their political parties as such—both the PSUC and the POUM were excluded, in a purported effort to avoid further rivalry—but through their labor federations. The CNT had four and the UGT three seats. The bourgeois *Esquerra* was assigned three ministers and the agrarian Union of Rabassaires one. Soviet influence, it was reported, had contributed to the ousting of the POUM from the government. The POUM asserted that it was the only real revolutionary party in Spain and announced plans to found, in cooperation with Swedish, German and Italian Socialists and the British Independent Labour party, a Fifth International which should follow a policy independent of both Stalin's and Trotsky's influence.³⁹

SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Internal struggles among the workers had not prevented them from carrying forward a program of practical socialization. As already noted, the large land-holders had succeeded through support of Franco in stopping agrarian reform in the regions controlled by the Rebels. The labor organizations, on their part, by backing the established governments at Madrid and Barcelona, made distinct advances toward their goal of fundamental economic and social reform. From the outset of the revolt groups of workers took the initiative in occupying factories and other properties, and later forced the authorities to legalize these steps. In the country the peasants seized lands, declared rents and dues abolished and sometimes burned land titles. In many cases war needs were the primary factor which induced extension of government control. As early as July 28 a decree of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce at Madrid provided for a committee with authority over all industries. Before a month had passed, government intervention in 600 plants was reported at the capital. These included heavy industries, transport, large commercial and distributive enterprises

39. *New York Times*, January 3, 1937.

such as stores, restaurants and hotels, public utilities, and various factories and businesses whose owners were reported to have fled.⁴⁰

In Catalonia the proletarian groups were even more aggressive than at Madrid. Decrees were obtained assuring the masses a 40-hour week, 15 per cent wage increases, debt moratorium, suspension of evictions, and 25 per cent decreases in rents. Many large factories, department stores and shops were taken over by labor groups and run by workers' committees. Public utilities suffered the same fate, as did the Ford and General Motors assembly plants. Both the Barcelona and the Madrid governments, however, pledged ultimate compensation for foreign property seized.⁴¹

The real situation with regard to socialization was decidedly spotty in character. Procedure had been substantially *de facto*, and had varied from district to district, from town to town and even from factory to factory. Where the workers were aggressive and well-organized, the business prosperous and the owners or managers unpopular, labor control might be promptly and completely established. Under different conditions, the owners' prerogatives might suffer little or no curtailment.⁴²

Various economic decrees had attempted to establish legal uniformity for what was in fact an exceedingly chequered situation. Of these the most sweeping in Catalonia was a measure of October 24, which declared: "The principle of the economic-social organization of big business shall be collective production. The substitution of collective for private property, as understood by the Council of the Generalidad, means the collectivizing of the property, that is to say the capital, of large enterprise, while allowing private property in consumption goods and small industry to remain."

The decree provided for the obligatory socialization of all commercial and industrial enterprises employing more than 100 workers, and authorized socialization of smaller concerns on certain conditions. The executive management of the socialized companies was to be placed in the hands of a Council of Enterprise, elected by a general meeting of the workers. The Council in turn would appoint a director, responsible for the active management of the concern. Compensation was assured

40. *New York Times*, August 24, 1936 and *International Press Correspondence*, October 17, 1936.

41. The value of United States investments in Spain is estimated at \$80,000,000, of which \$64,000,000 is represented by the National Telephone Company, a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company.

42. For descriptions of actions in individual communities and factories, cf. *Generalitat de Catalunya, Comunicat de Premsa* (Barcelona), December 11, 1936, and *The Spanish Revolution*, cited, December 2, 1936, pp. 2, 7.

for foreign interests represented in industry, but it was prescribed that this should be "calculated in national currency"; compensation for domestic interests was left subject to later determination.

In industries and businesses not socialized, organization of a workers' committee of control was declared obligatory. This committee was to have jurisdiction over working conditions, receipts and expenditures, and control of production, and to examine the company's balance sheet and yearly statement.

Provision was also made for the formation in each industry of a General Council, which would regulate total production in the light of consumption requirements and other factors, organize sales centers and "negotiate banking facilities and credit." The decisions of the General Councils were to be compulsory.⁴³ These Councils in separate industries were to be coordinated by a Council of Economy for all Catalonia, which had been originally established by a decree of August 11.

Thus the workers, organized in factory and industrial groups, rather than the state, were to hold ownership of the large-scale means of production. The function of the state was principally to be one of regulation and coordination. In Catalonia it was evident that the Anarcho-Syndicalist emphases on liberty and local self-government would materially modify realization of the Marxist program for centralized administration of economic life.

SPAIN—VORTEX OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

Meanwhile, international tension over the Spanish struggle continued to increase. The Soviet Union, following its declaration to the London committee on October 23 that it would not consider itself bound by the non-intervention agreement "to any greater extent than the remaining participants," had changed its policy toward the Loyalists. Various observers reported an increasing flow of Russian supplies to the government. The extensive influence exercised at Madrid by Marcel Rosenberg, Soviet Ambassador, and at Barcelona by Soviet Consul-General Antonov-Ovseenkov became a subject of comment.⁴⁴ While Premier Largo

43. *Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya*, No. 302, October 28, 1936, pp. 373-76. A partial English text is given in *The Spanish Revolution*, cited, November 4, 1936.

44. Cf. *New York Times*, January 3, 1937; and especially article by William P. Carney, *ibid.*, December 7, 1936. This correspondent declared that the Soviet Ambassador enjoyed a voice concerning cabinet appointments, frequently attended cabinet meetings and had vetoed proposals that Madrid be abandoned without resistance. He asserted: "Far in advance of Russia's decision to aid the Spanish government openly . . . Russian war materials, including trucks, planes, tanks and munitions, were reported in the Madrid press as being received

Caballero continued to maintain that the government forces sought maintenance of a parliamentary republic rather than establishment of a soviet régime, he sent a New Year's message to the Soviet Union in which he declared: "The Spanish working class is forever united with the Russian workers . . . The proletariat of Spain will always strive during the war and after the war is over to follow the example of your great country."⁴⁵

Germany and Italy had staked their prestige on the success of the Rebels even more than the Soviet Union had done with respect to the Madrid government. On November 18 the two Fascist powers, without waiting for Franco to capture Madrid, recognized the Burgos Junta—not merely as a belligerent but as the legal government of Spain.⁴⁶ On November 27 the Largo Caballero government appealed to the League, invoking Article XI of the Covenant. It alleged that international peace was being endangered by the "armed intervention of Italy and Germany."

The most alarming factor in the situation was the rapid increase of German "volunteers" in Spain. On December 1, 5000 German reinforcements for the Rebels landed at Cadiz. By Christmas, according to many reports, the number had approximately doubled. General Faupel, appointed German chargé at Burgos, was said to have informed Hitler that Franco needed at least 40,000 additional troops to assure Rebel victory. The possible creation of a Nazi standing army in Spain seriously menaced the Mediterranean interests, not only of Britain and France, but Italy. Dominance of the Fascist powers in Spanish Morocco and on the Balearic Islands⁴⁷ might easily interfere with British imperial communications in time of war. Possession of Majorca by a non-Spanish power would block the sea-routes between France and its African possessions. Moreover, the establishment of German hegemony in Spain would mean that France would be forced to provide for defense of

by the Loyalist forces." The Soviet Union concluded two commercial treaties with the Valencia and Barcelona governments in November 1936. But M. Litvinov denied that the Soviet Union wished to establish a Soviet state in Spain. Cf. *New York Times*, November 29, 1936.

45. *Journal des Nations*, November 25, 1936, and *New York Times*, January 2, 1937.

46. Portugal had broken off diplomatic relations with the Madrid government on October 23.

47. A number of German officers are reported to have resided for some time at Tetuán. Their relation to a pan-Arab conference, which opened on October 21 in that city, attracted considerable attention. (*Journal des Nations*, November 30, 1936.) It has been frequently rumored that, under a secret treaty negotiated in 1926 between Mussolini and the Spanish dictator, Primo de Rivera, Italy had been ceded a base on the Balearic Islands. (*L'Afrique Française*, Paris, August-September 1936, p. 475.)

its Pyrenean frontier. This direct threat to the vital interests of the two Western democracies increased their former concern to prevent the Spanish conflict from precipitating a general European war. Nor did Italy, despite its previous cooperation with Germany in aiding the Rebels, welcome the emergence of the Reich as a Mediterranean power.

On December 4 a Franco-British suggestion to extend the non-intervention agreement to cover foreign volunteers destined for either Spanish faction was blocked by Germany, Italy and Portugal. A proposal to end the civil war by mediation also met with failure.

The increasing flow of German troops to Spain led Britain and France to act again on December 27, when they addressed notes to Berlin, Rome, Lisbon and Moscow, stressing the dangers involved in the continued shipment of "volunteers." Meanwhile, negotiations between Rome and London, consummated in the accord of January 2, 1937, had apparently opened for Italy an easier road toward assurance of its position in the Mediterranean than support of General Franco could offer. In an exchange of notes annexed to the treaty Count Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, confirmed the British government's understanding that: "So far as Italy is concerned the integrity of the present territories of Spain shall in all circumstances remain intact and unmodified." Anglo-Italian agreement on such a pledge was interpreted as barring not only Italian occupation of the Balearic Islands or German seizure of other Spanish territory, but also creation of an independent Socialist or Communist state in Catalonia under Russian or French protection. The agreement led some observers to forecast withdrawal of Rome's assistance to the Rebels, although on January 3 it was reported that 5000 armed Italians had disembarked from three Italian warships at Cadiz within the past few days.⁴⁸

Activity of German naval vessels in Spanish waters further complicated the situation. On December 24 a Loyalist cruiser seized the German steamer *Palos*. The vessel was subsequently released, but the Loyalists retained alleged war ma-

terials found in the cargo and one Spanish passenger, accused of being a Rebel agent. Berlin claimed that the *Palos* had been seized on the high seas, and in "reprisal" German war craft captured one Spanish freighter and forced another ashore by shell fire. The Valencia government declared these steps represented an "act of war" and announced it would resist further aggression by German vessels.

Meanwhile the issuance by the American State Department on December 28 of an export license for approximately \$3,000,000 worth of used airplanes and airplane motors to the Spanish Loyalists was viewed as threatening the neutrality policy which had been adopted by the United States. The existing Neutrality Act did not apply to civil wars. On convening in January, however, Congress promptly approved legislation, signed by President Roosevelt on January 8, authorizing the executive to extend the law to the Spanish struggle. Earlier, Washington had exerted moral influence to prevent arms shipments to either side, in accordance with a statement by Under Secretary Phillips on August 7 that the United States would "scrupulously refrain from any interference whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish situation."⁴⁹

CONCLUSION

Six months from its outbreak, the war in Spain had clearly taken on a three-fold character. It was not only a military conflict between contending Spanish factions, but also a deep-cutting social struggle, with the forces of revolutionary change aligned against those of reaction. Moreover, the Iberian Peninsula had become the vortex for Europe's swirling tides of international rivalry. Power politics and clashing ideologies had led to German and Italian aid for the Rebels, and Soviet aid for the Loyalists. Thus, foreign interference served to intensify the bitterness of domestic conflict.

In military operations, the Rebels to date have held the initiative, and the Loyalist forces have been consistently on the defensive. If for the moment the element of foreign interference is ignored, long-term factors apparently favor the government cause. Its gold reserve of approximately \$700,000,000⁵⁰ gives it the advantage in financial resources. With Catalonia and Asturias in its hands, it controls the areas of

48. *New York Times*, January 4, 1937. Four days later it was estimated that 50,000 foreigners of 12 nationalities were in Spain. Of these the Rebels were reported to have, exclusive of Moors and the Foreign Legion, nearly 30,000—including 14,000 Italians, 12,000 Germans and 4,000 Portuguese, Irish and other nationalities. On the government side, the International Brigade on the Madrid front numbered 8,000 foreigners, with 10,000 others in training behind the lines. Eighty per cent of Franco's air forces, it was estimated, was German, 15 per cent Italian and 5 per cent Spanish. Half the Loyalist airmen, it was reported, were French and half Russian, with a few of other nationalities. Cf. article by Webb Miller, *New York Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1937.

49. United States, Department of State, *Press Releases*, August 15, 1936.

50. The Rebels were believed to be financing their campaign principally from three sources: (1) "voluntary" contributions from Fascists, Monarchists, clericals, and large landholders and industrialists such as Juan March; (2) control of foreign exchange for products exported from their territories; (3) credits from Germany and Italy. Those from the former were reported to total \$180,000,000. *New York Times*, January 10, 1937.

major industrial production. Valencia and Catalonia also are important agricultural regions. Further, Franco's evident dependence on foreign troops indicates that the government commands far wider popular support than the Rebels. The army officers who initiated the revolt had apparently planned a coup whose success would be assured automatically by the wholesale defection of Spain's entire military machine. But their calculations miscarried because of two unforeseen developments. A sufficient minority of the armed forces remained loyal to afford the government some organized support. Moreover, a rising of the popular masses in countless villages, as well as in cities like Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia, balked the plans of the militarists. The Rebels early achieved advantage, due to superiority in professional leadership, in organization and discipline, and in modern equipment. Their advance reached the limits of Madrid early in November, but since that time they have been held at the city's gates. Meanwhile the discipline of the Loyalist troops has markedly improved, and their armament has been augmented.

The popular strength of the government cause is based in large part on its pledges of social reform—already partly redeemed—as opposed to the Fascist and reactionary tenets espoused by the Rebels. At the start of the rebellion Madrid's Popular Front government was composed entirely of liberal Republicans; not a Socialist or Communist held a seat. But now the Loyalist régimes, both at Valencia and Barcelona, are dominated by proletarian groups. Growing unity prevails. The Socialists and Anarcho-Syndicalists, long bitter rivals with radically different approaches to social reconstruction, have gone far toward pooling their differences. With them also are linked the middle-class parties. In Catalonia, where the middle-class is particularly important, this group under the leadership of President Companys has aligned itself, not with the Fascists as in Germany, Italy and Portugal, but with the industrial proletariat and the peasants. This fact may prove of far-reaching significance. The Loyalists have taken definite steps toward a socialized economy. At Madrid war needs have been an important factor in this trend. The process has been carried even further in Catalonia where it points toward establishment of a new social order. Developments to date forecast a hybrid Anarcho-Socialist régime in which large enterprises would be collectivized, but small enterprises would be permitted, for a time at least, to continue under private operation modified by a considerable degree of government and labor supervision.

The transformation of the civil war into a social struggle may spell doom for Spanish democracy in its bourgeois political phase. Depending on which side wins, it may be replaced either by a military-Fascist dictatorship, supported by foreign troops and financial aid; or possibly by some sort of federal system, linking together a number of semi-autonomous regional administrations characterized by various degrees of socialization.

The international character of the Spanish struggle, however, complicates all attempts to chart its future course. To term it a civil war has involved a misnomer practically from the start. To what degree the Rebels had entered into relations with Germany and Italy prior to the revolt is not yet clear. In any case, within two weeks of its inception, General Franco had received airplanes and other military supplies from the Fascist powers. Russian assistance to the government came only after these nations had taken the initiative with the Rebels, and Soviet aid was not appreciably large until November. Supplementing the shipment of supplies, "volunteers" later poured into Spain to strengthen both factions. Early in January it was estimated that the Rebels had been re-enforced by 30,000 foreigners, exclusive of the Moors and the Foreign Legion. On the government side there were approximately 20,000 foreign troops.⁵¹

This foreign aid apparently proved decisive at two points in the struggle. Following the Rebels' early failure to take Madrid and Barcelona, their cause seemed lost until the arrival of German and Italian aid strengthened their hand. Conversely the appearance of the International Brigade and the receipt of Soviet munitions and supplies probably saved Madrid, when it was on the point of falling to the Insurgents early in November.

But the international phase of the Spanish war may determine not alone the outcome of that struggle. It has been said: "In certain measure, the Iberian Peninsula has served to catalyze European conflicts. It has precipitated them, in the double sense of the word."⁵² No nation, apparently, is willing to provoke a general war for the sake of its stake in Spain. Yet, in the absence of more effective curbs than those provided by the London Non-Intervention Committee, international rivalry may serve materially to prolong the Spanish conflict and, with it, a continual menace to European peace.

51. *New York Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1937.

52. Jean Rollin, "La Guerre civile en Espagne," *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), October 1936, p. 78.